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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH 
srr~ATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
DAVID FARNSWORTH, 
Defendant and Appella;nt. 
Case 
No. 9546 
BRIEF OF. RESP·ONDENT 
NATURE OF CASE 
Defendant was convicted of burglary in the second 
degree, 76-9-3, U.C.A.1953, in the Second Judicial District 
Court on June 16, 1961, and contends that an incompetent 
defense and other legal errors require reversal. 
DISPOSITION MADE BY LOWER COURT 
Defendant was convicted of burglary in the second 
degree on June 16, 1961, at a trial before th.e Honorable 
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Charles G. Cowley, sitting without a jury. After convic-
tion, the defendant was referred to the Adult Probation 
and Parole Department for a pre-sentence report. On 
July 3, 1961, defendant was present in court with counsel 
who argued the imposition of the sentence, and the court 
continued the sentence date until July 10, 1961. On July 
10, 1961, defendant was sentenced to the State Peniten-
tiary for an indeterminate period of one to twenty years. 
At the time of imposition of sentence, the defendant's 
counsel was not present. On July 31, 1961, the defend-
ant's motion for a new trial was denied. The defendant 
. . 
filed a notice of appeal and is free on bond, pending the 
outcome. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Affirmance of the Trial Court's judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 12th of December, 1960, a complaint was is-
sued against defendant for the crime of burglary in the 
second degree. (R. 1) On the 15th of December; 1960, the 
defendant and counsel appeared in open court and waived 
preliminary hearing. (R. 3) Thereafter, au information 
was filed (R .. 5) and defendant entered a plea of not 
guilty on the 3rd of January, 1961. On June 16, 1961, the 
defendant 'vas tried 'vithout a jury and convicted of the 
charge. 
The facts and circumstances of the trial are mate-
rial to the defendant's claim of incompetent r_epresenta-
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tion. A jury trial was waived by the defendant (R. 1), 
\Vho \vas represented by counsel. Counsel was apparently 
hired by the defendant, as no indication of appointment 
appears of record. 
Six witnesses were called by the State. The first 
"~itness, Donna Young, testified that she had closed 
Young's Market in Roy, Utah, on the evening of the 6th 
of December, 1960, and then opened it on the morning 
of the 7th of December at about 10 :00 a.m. (R. 3, 4). She 
indicated the padlock on the door had been ripped off, and 
certain items were missing from the store. She identified 
certain property in the courtroom as being items from 
her store. (R. 5) She was cross-examined by the defense 
counsel concerning whether there was any indication of 
a breaking. (R. 7, 8) 
The second witness, Gene King, testified as an accom-
plice and admitted the commission of the burglary with 
the defendant. (R. 8-11) With reference to the time of the 
crime, the record discloses ( R. 9) : 
'' Q. Did you shortly after midnight, which would 
be early morning of December 7th, have occasion 
to be in Roy, Utah 1 
"A. Yes." 
Thereafter, he testified tha.t at that time he and the ac-
cused burglarized Young's Market. He testified that after 
the burglary (R. 12): 
''We transferred the stuff from the back seat to 
the trunk of the car. Then we stayed in the car 
and slept until that morning." 
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During the course of the direct examination of King, de-
fense counsel objected to the admission of evidence. (R. 
14) There was no cross-examination. 
Thereafter, a Roy City Patrolman testified as to the 
apprehension of the defendant during a routine check, 
and the seizure of items taken from the store. (R. 14-17) 
During the course of examination, several objections were 
raised by defense counsel, and sustained by the court. 
(R. 17) 
Thereafter, two peace officers testified as to the physi-
cal evidence at the site of the burglary, and the chain 
of custody of items found at the scene (R. 18-19), and 
as to the chain of custody of items taken from the pres-
ence of defendant. (R. 20-21) A deputy sheriff further 
testified as to chain of custody of the sized items, a~d as 
to a criminalistic examination of a screwdriver taken 
from the presence of the defendant and King. (R. 24) 
The State rested. 
The defense chose not to put on evidence, and no 
arguments were made. (R. 25) The court adjudged de-
fendant guilty. 
The sentencing was continued, and later a ne"· coun-
sel argued the appropriate sentence to the court, and 
the matter was continued. (R. 1A-4A) Thereafter, the de-
fendant was sentenced to confinement in the Penitentiary 
in the absence of counsel. (R. 4A) A motion for a new 
trial thereafter made was denied. ( R. 19) 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Based upon the above facts, the defendant claims 
three errors exist which require reversal. The State sub-
mits none of the claimed errors require reversal. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I. 
THE DEFENSE OF THE DEFENDANT AT 
TRIAL WAS NOT SO INCOMPETENT AS TO 
CONSTITUTE A SHAM OR MOCKERY OF 
.JUSTICE AND THUS TO REQUIRE RE-
VERSAL. 
PoiNT II. 
THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS A FINDING 
THAT THE BURGLARY CHARGED WAS 
COMMITTED IN THE NIGHTTIME. 
PoiNT III. 
THE ABSENCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL AT 
THE TIME OF IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE 
DOES NOT REQUIRE REVERSAL. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I. 
THE DEFENSE OF THE DEFENDANT AT 
TRIAL WAS NOT SO INCOMPETENT AS TO 
CONSTITUTE A SHAM OR MOCKERY OF 
JUSTICE AND THUS TO REQUIRE RE-
VERSAL. 
The defendant contends that he was inadequately 
represented at. trial, and, as a result, he is entitled to a 
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new trial. The appellant bases his contention upon the 
provisions of Amendments Five, Six and Fourteen of 
the Federal Constitution, and upon Article I, Sections 7 
and 12 of the Utah Constitution, being the right to coun-
sel and due process provisions. To the degree that the 
defendant may rely upon the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments to the Federal Constitution, his. reliance is mis-
placed, since the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the 
Federal Constitution are not applicable to the states. 
Betts v. Bra.dy, 316 U. S. 455 (1942). The constitutional 
construction is succinctly noted in 11 Am. Jur., Constitu-
tional Law, Sec. 316, where, referring to the Fifth Amend-
ment, it is said: 
''The foreg<>ing provisions of the Federal Bill of 
Rights, however, apply only to the United States. 
In no manner are these provisions limitations on 
the States. q 
And, in reference to the Sixth Amendment, it is noted 
in the same section, 1961 Supplement : 
''However, the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment does not incorporate, as such, 
the specific guarantees found in the Sixth Amend-
ment * * *.'' 
In Po1DPll v . . Alabattna., 287 U. S. 45, the Supreme Court 
held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment may incorporate certain rights to counsel, 
and held that in all capital cases the right to counsel 'vas 
essential to due process. Subsequently, in Betts v. Brady, 
supra, the court was confronted w,.ith a contention that 
due.- process requires counsel in all non-capital cases. 
6 
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rrhe court rejected the cont(lntion and stated the rule in 
terms of PHsential fairness. It said: 
''As we have said, the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits the conviction and incarceration of one 
'vhose trial is offensive to the common and funda-
mental ideas of fairness and right, and while want 
of counsel in a particular case may result in a con-
viction lacking in such fundamental fairness, we 
cannot say that the amendment embodies an inex-
orable command that no trial for any offense, or 
in any court, can be fairly conducted and justice 
accorded a defendant who is not represented by 
counsel.'' 
Thus, any claim of Federal Constitutional violation must 
be a matter of due process. As to the specific issue of 
whether due process of law can be said to encompass the 
question of competency of counsel, it was noted in Penn 
v. Smith, 188 Va. 367, 49 S.E. 2d 600 (1948), that there 
had been no express holding by the United States Su-
preme Court on the issue.' The situation apparently is 
still the same today, since it is noted in 74 ALR 2d, p. 
1397, that: 
'' • • • there seemingly has been up to this time 
no direct pronouncement by the United States 
Supreme Court concerning the subject under dis-
cussion [incompetency of counsel] * • •. '' 
It is to be noted that in Powell v. Alabama, supra, as 
well as Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945), and Reece v. 
t Beaney, Right to Counsel in American Courts ( 1955), p. 189, notes: 
"Perhaps the only area where the lower courts have been under siege 
on a matter .not clarified by the Supreme Court is that of competency 
of counsel and effective appointment of counsel." 
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Georgia, 350 U. S. 85 ( 1955), among other cases, the Su-
preme Court stated that effective assistance of coun-
sel in a state prosecution for a capital crime is a require-
ment of due process, and in Betts v. Brady, supra, it noted 
that in certain non-capital cases it may be necessary to 
essential fairness; however, the standard of what is re-
quired has never been passed on by the U. S. Supreme 
Court. 
The lower federal courts have passed on the matter. 
However, they have generally said that "lack of prepara-
tion or interest, incompetency or inadequacy'' are ordi-
narily not sufficient circumstances to set aside a convic-
tion. Ex Parte Haum.esch, 82 F. 2d 588 (9th Cir. 1936); 
Hudspeth v. McDonald, 120 F. 2d 962 (lOth Cir. 1941); 
Johnnene v. Graham, 138 F. Supp. 542 (D. C. Utah 1956); 
Barker v. United States, 227 F. 2d 431 (lOth Cir. 1955). 
The state courts, passing on the same contention, 
have also held that their constitutional provisions simi-
lar to Article I, Sections 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitu-
tion, were to be construed in the same fashion. Ex Parte 
Ga1nmon, 255 Ala. 502, 52 So. 2d 369 (1951); Daries v. 
Peoplr, 10 Ill. 2d 11, 139 N.E. 2d 216 (1956); People v. 
Grg·urerich, 153 Cal. App. 2d 806, 315 P. 2d 391 (1957). 
For these reasons, it is submitted that whether the issue 
is framed under the State or Federal Constitutional pro-
visions, the same standard is applicable. The general rule 
applicable in cases 'vhere post-conviction or appellate 
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claims of ineffective counsel are made is summarized in 
74 AljR 2d 1403 in the following terms: 
'' • "" "" most courts considering • * * the question 
of incompetency of retained counsel are generally 
agreed that the Judgment of conviction is void 
'vhen counsel's representation has been so inade-
quate as to make the trial a farce and a mockery 
of justice, thereby denying the accused a fair trial 
(due process of law) * "" *." 
The Nevada Supreme Court stated it as follows in 
~'Jtate v. Ju,kech, 49 Nev. 217, 242 Pac. 590 (1926): 
"We think that the rule deducible from the cases 
is that a new trial should not be granted by an 
appellate court in a criminal case on account of 
the incompetency or neglect of counsel, unless it 
is so great that the defendant is prejudiced and 
thereby deprived of a fair trial." 
Thus the trial must be of such a low character as to ren-
der the trial a "farce and a mockery." People v. Durpee, 
156 Cal. App. 2d 60, 319 P. 2d 39. 
It is submitted that the defense in this instance, al-
though some may say it could have been done better, was 
not a ''mockery of justice'' so as to warrant reversal. 
Defendant protests that certain aspects of the case 
require a judgment of reversal. An examination of these 
contentions discloses that they are without merit. First, 
it is inferentially contended that the waiving of a jury 
trial was such a circumstance as would support a claim 
of misconduct. It can hardly be claimed that a trial be-
fore a judge makes the trial a mockery, nor can such an 
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inference be drawn, based on other facts of record. Trial 
strategy or tactics may be best served in laying the mat-
ter before a judge alone. In Lucas v. State, 227 Ind. 486, 
86 N.E. 2d 682 (1949), the defendant appeared at trial 
and apparently acquiesced in the waiver of a jury trial, 
as defendant did here. Thereafter the contention was 
made that defendant desired a jury and some evidence 
supported this contention; however, the Indiana Court 
denied any claim to relief based on a claim of incom-
petency. 
The absence of an opening statement in no way re-
duces the trial to a mockery. The purpose of the opening 
statement is to inform the jury or the court of the evi-
dence to be presented so as to make the evidence easier 
to follow. However, where the case is not complex, and 
issues are being tried to the judge, the need to present 
an opening statement is not present. It should be noted 
that the prosecution also waived the opening statement, 
and such a practice is common in a non-jury trial for both 
sides. Indeed, authorities differ as to the value of an 
opening statement, Rothblatt, Successful Techniques in 
the Trial of Criminal Cases, 1961, p. 38, a.nd its absence 
here will not add to a rlaim of jurisprudential mockery. 
Defendant's contentions that defense counsel should 
hay·e compelled the State to prove facts or elements mak-
ing up the crime are some,vhat ludicrous. The duty is on 
the prosecution to prove the defendant's guilt beyond all 
reasonable doubt. The duty rests upon the prosecution 
to prove each <.)lement of the crime, and a defense counsel 
10 
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who disclosed weaknesses to the prosecution or proved 
omitted elements might himself be suspect in his loyalty. 
Indeed, the defense counsel's actions in holding the prose-
rution to their own proof might have been his best trial 
tactic, since should the prosecution neglect to prove an 
essential element, the trial judge could only acquit. Where 
the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, this course may be 
the only defense open. 
Equally as unmeritorious is any claim that the de-
fense counsel was remiss in not impeaching a state wit-
ness. Defendant appears to be referring to the accom-
plice, Gene King; however, King testified to committing 
the crime with the defendant (R. 10), and hence, by his 
own admission, bad committed a felony. Certainly, it is 
not incumbent upon defense counsel to point out to the 
court what is obvious for all to see, upon penalty of an 
accusation against his competency. 
The defendant's contention that defense counsel 
failed to object to inadmissible evidence, apparently the 
result of an illegal search and seizure, is equally ques-
tionable in demonstrating incompetency. The trial of de-
fendant was on June 16, 1961. At the time of trial the 
Utah law was not to exclude evidence illegally obtained. 
State v. Fair, 10 U. 2d 365, 353 P. 2d 615 (1960). The 
U. S. Supreme Court did not hand down its revolutionary 
decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 343 (1961), compelling 
such exclusion, until June 19, 1961, or three days after 
the defendant's trial. Even had an objection been made, 
and overruled, it is doubtful if the defendant's position 
11 
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would be any better on appeal, since the present trend of 
authority is not to apply the Mapp rule retroactively. 
People v. Figueroa, 30 LW 2158 (N.Y.); People v. Ber-
trand, 30 LW 2028 (N.Y.). It would appear that defend-
ant would have counsel do things of dubious value in 
order to demonstrate his competency. 
The only real issue raised by defendant attacking his 
counsel's performance is whether his failure to cross-ex-
amine all the State's "~itnesses, and to present evidence 
on behalf of the defendant was of such a nature as to 
reduce the trial to a ''mockery of justice.'' Apparently 
defendant would have counsel examine every witness 
whether the examination would or would not contribute 
to the defendant's position. However, Roth blatt, supra, 
p. 47, points out: 
''Only cross-examine when you can aid defend-
a;n.t 's case or weaken prosecution's case.'' 
See also Wellman, The Art of Cross-Exanzination, p. 8. 
Had counsel cross-examined the accomplice or police 
officers, it is doubtful that it "rould haYe in any " ... ay aided 
the defendant, and certainly could haYe seriously harmed 
him. Thus, it could have resulted in an assertion by King 
that defendant had suggested or initiated the idea of 
the burglary, or that he had made damaging admissions 
or got smart "·ith the police. It appears clear as to what 
the defense counsel here intended to do. With the eYidence 
of guilt over"·helming, and \Yith a previous bad record to 
overcome (R. 1J\-4A), his obYious strategy " ... as one " ... ell 
known to experienced criminal la\Yyers - to place the 
1~ 
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erimP bPfore thP court in the simplest, most unaggravated 
terms in an effort to mitigate a sentence. With only a 
prima facie case before i he eourt, shO\\,.ing a burglary 
where food and beverage items were taken, coupled with 
the defendant's age, the trial court would be more likely, 
in vie"'" of a bad past record, to accord the accused another 
ehance than had defense counsel thrashed the witness 
without chance of changing the result, elicited hostile 
testimony, and had defendant perjuriously denied his 
guilt in the face of overwhelming evidence to the con-
trary. Had defendant taken the stand, his past crimi-
nal conduct may well have been placed before the court, 
without the diluting accompaniment of a probation re-
port. Had additional character testimony been presented, 
it would have opened the door for rebuttal. 
In Darcy v. Cla.udy, 367 Pa. 130, 79 A. 2d 785 (1951), 
the court was faced with an argument that counsel was 
incompetent because he did not put defendant on the 
stand or produce reputation testimony. In rejecting the 
argument, the court said: 
''Whether he should have had the relator take the 
witness stand and have produced reputation testi-
mony was obviously, as every trial lawyer knows, 
a matter of judgment to be decided in the light of 
the circumstances as measured by various consid-
erations of poliey.'' 
In the instant case the trial strategy obviously called for 
limiting the evidence to its simplest form. Defense coun-
sel made objections in areas where it was possible that 
damaging testimony could have been elicited. (R. 17, 18) 
13 
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In addition, he cross-examined the essential witness on 
the issue of the breaking. Under these circumstances, the 
defendant cannot complain because he now feels a differ-
ent tack would have been more successful. 24 ALR 1022, 
64 ALR 437. 
It should be noted that the evidence of record in-
dicating the guilt of the accused is extremely strong. In 
Hendrickson v. Overlade, 131 F. Supp. 561 (1955), the 
court noted the importance of evidence of guilt where 
the allegation was of an incompetent defense counsel. 
It said: 
''We also recognize that in a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding this court • • • [is] not concerned as to the 
guilt or innocence of the petitioner of the crime for 
which he was convicted. However, when the ques-
tion of incompetency of counsel is called into ques-
tion by the petitioner, the question of guilt must 
be considered by us for the reason that if defend-
ant was conclusively guilty the question as to just 
what his counsel could do by way of defense is 
important.'' 
Other cases and authorities have so noted. Wilson v. 
State, 273 Wis. 522, 78 N.W. 2d 917 (1956); MiUer v. 
Hudspeth, 164 Kan. 688, 192 P. 2d 147 (1948); 74 ALR 
2d 1414. 
Where the evidence, as here, is compelling as to the 
accused's guilt, counsel has little alternative as to ho"" 
to conduct the defense. Here counsel apparently deter-
mined that the best way to proceed was to diminish the 
criminality by limiting the evidence presented on both 
14 
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sides to a prima facie case. A defendant has a right to 
plead not guilty and to charge the State to its burden of 
proof. If the State meets the burden by overwhelming 
l\vidence, the defendant has no case to present, can he 
claim his trial \vas a sham because none \vas manufar-
tured ·1 It is submitted he cannot. 
1\lere irregularities, or differences of opinion as to 
strategy will not suffice to make a trial a sham, Soulia, v. 
O'Brie11, 94 F. Supp. 764, nor incompetency or neglect 
alone. 74 ALR 2d 1399. 
In the instant case defense counsel was an experi-
enced and reputable attorney of many years, well schooled 
in the defense of criminal matters. His strategy was 
obviously directed towards placing the State to its bur-
den, limiting the proof to the barest essentials in an 
effort to mitigate criminality, with the hope of sustaining 
a second chance. In such an instance, as was noted in 
People v. Martin, 210 l\Iich. 139, 177 N.W. 193 (1920): 
''An appellate court cannot determine whether the 
course pursued by an attorney defending a man 
charged with crime * * * was the best means of 
promoting his defense.'' 
It is submitted the defendant's contention is with-
out merit, and that the facts fully support a conclusion 
that defendant's trial was not of such a low level as t<;> 
constitute a mockery of justice, and, hence, there was no 
denial of due process warranting reversal. 
15 
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PoiNT II. 
THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS A FINDING 
THAT THE BURGLARY CHARGED WAS 
COMMITrrED IN THE NIGHTTIME. 
The defendant contends that the evidence was in-
sufficient to show that the burglary in question was com-
mitted in the nighttime. The evidence of record shows 
that Young's Market in Roy, Utah, was closed on the eve-
ning of December 6, 1960, and opened at about 10 :00 a.m. 
the morning of the 7th of December, 1960, at which time 
it appeared that the store had been burglarized. If this 
were all the evidence of record concerning the time of 
the burglary, there would be no more evidence than that 
presented in State v. Miller, 24 Utah 312, 67 Pac. 790 
(1902) upon which the defendant relies, and wherein the 
Court noted : 
''Nor are there any circumstances in evidence of 
such a character as to show beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the prisoner took the goods in the night-
time.'' 
In the instant case, however, additional evidence of rec-
ord does appear to show that the burglary in question was 
committed in the nighttime. The record reflects the fol-
lowing: (R. 9) 
'' Q. Did you shortly after midnight, which would 
be the early morning of Deeember 7th, have occa-
sion to be in Roy, Utah? 
' 'A. Yes, we were. 
''Q. And was David with you at that time! 
''A. Yes. 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~ 'Q. And how did you get out to Roy at that time? 
''A. We were in his car. 
''Q. Where did you go when you went to Roy at 
that time? 
''A. Well, we went to a little store in Roy there in 
the southwest end of Roy. 
"Q. Can you describe the store that you went to-, 
~Ir. King? 
''A. Well, it was a brick in the front and a. cinder 
block on the sides. It had a door on the south -
front door on the south - a side door on the west 
side. It had windows around the sides. 
"Q. As you approached the store, "~hat was done 
\Yi th the car? 
"A. We had parked it about fifty, sixty feet back 
from the store on the east side of the store. 
'' Q. Did you then go to the store T 
"A. Yes." 
The record further reflects that the accomplice King 
testified : ( R. 12) 
"Q. What did you do? 
''A. We transferred the stuff from the back seat 
to the trunk of the car. Then "\Ve stayed in the 
car and slept until that morning.'' 
Thus there is direct evidence, therefore, that the bur-
glary was committed around midnight, and additional in-
ferenti~l testimony to indicate that it was not yet morn-
ing. This supplies the evidence found lacking in the 
Miller case. In State v. Richards, 29 Utah 310, 81 Pac. 
142 (199~), ~he court was also ~aced with a claim that 
the evidence did not support a finding that the burglary 
17 
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in question was committed in the nighttime. The court 
noted that other circumstantial evidence would support 
a finding that the burglary was committed during the 
nighttime. The evidence disclosed that the owner had 
full view of the burglarized premises from sunrise until 
opening of the store and detected nothing. The court held 
the Miller case to be inapplicable because circumstantial 
evidence of the burglary being committed in the night-
time was of record. 
Here, the evidence, without contradiction, shows that 
the breaking and entering occurred shortly after mid-
night in the early morning, and that after the burglary, 
defendant stayed in his car until the next morning. The 
evidence amply sustains the conclusion that the burglary 
was committed in the nighttime. The evidence is similar 
to that in People v. Mendoza, 17 Cal. App. 157, 118 Pac. 
964 ( 1911), where the court said: 
''The evidence, however, without contradiction, 
shows that the entry to the building was made 'in 
the evening some time after dark. This was clear-
ly sufficient to justify the conclusion of the jury 
that the offense was committed after sunset.'' 
Certainly, here, the evidence would clearly justify the 
trial court's conclusion that the crime was committed in 
the nighttime. The facts in the instant case are no less 
supporting than those in State v-. Manger, 7 U. 2d 1, 315 
P. 2d 976 (1957), where the eourt noted: 
"Appellant's contention that there was no evi-
dence from which the jury could have determined 
the entry into the Trading Post was made during 
18 
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the nighttime is also \vithout merit. ..:-\.lthough 
there is no direct testimony of anyone discovering 
thl} Pllt ry l>t> fore daybreak, nevertheless the e·vi-
dence disclosed that appellant \vas at a party until 
1:30 or 2:00 a.m. of July 13, and that at about 
3 o'clock someone was heard to enter the house 
in "·hich appellant lived and shortly thereafter 
"·as seen to stand on his bed and reach up to the 
ceiling for something. From all these circum-
stances the jury could reasonably find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that appellant had entered the 
store sometime between 2 and 3 a.m. of July 13 
\vith the intent to commit larceny.'' 
Here there is direct evidence fixing the commission of the 
burglary at a time shortly after midnight, which amply 
sustains findings that the burglary was committed in the 
nighttime. 
PoiNT III. 
THE ABSENCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL· AT 
THE TIME OF IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE 
DOES NOT REQUIRE REVERSAL. 
The defendant contends it was error to impose sen-
tence upon him in the absence of his counsel. The record 
reflects that on June 16, 1961, the defendant was adjudged 
guilty. The sentencing was continued until June 26, 1961, 
and a pre-sentence report requested. (R. 26, 27). On 
the 26th of June, the matter was continued until the 3rd 
of July at the request of new counsel. (R. 12) On the 
3rd of July, 1961, the accused and his counsel appeared 
before the Honorable Parley E. Norseth, and counsel 
was afforded the opportunity of presenting his views on 
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the sentence to. be imposed, and arguing the merits of 
probation. (R. 1A-4A) 
The matter was continued until July 10, 1961, at 
between 2 :00 and 3 :00 P.M. ; however, on July 10, 1961, 
at 10 :00 A.M., the court, having apparently forgotten the 
time setting, sentenced defendant to confinement. Subse-
quently, on July 31, 1961, the defendant made a motion 
for a new trial, which was denied. (R. 19) Based upon 
the above facts, the defendant contends error was com-
mitted, and that he was denied his constitutional rights 
under the State and Federal Constitutions. 
It should be noted at the outset that the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution does not fully incorporate the right to coun-
sel at all stages of the proceedings, but rather, the Su-
preme Court of the United States has held that counsel, 
in a non-capital case, need only be afforded where the 
absence of counsel would cause the defendant's trial to 
be said to lack fundamental fairness. Betts v. Brady, 316 
U. S. 455 (1942). It does not appear that the Supreme 
Court has yet said that the absence of counsel at the 
sentencing of an accused in a non-capital case is per se 
a violation of due process of la\v in the absence of 
circumstances clearly demonstrating a ''fundamental 
lack of fairness.' '2 Thus, defendant's claim of a federal 
violation is only valid if the facts demonstrate suc.h a 
2 Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736 ( 1948) is a case where the Supreme 
Court found such a fundamental unfairness where the court considered 
matters as true in affixing the sentence which were in fact false and 
acted in an extremely unjudicious manner. ' 
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fundamental unfairness. Not e\·Pn the federal court~ 
have been able to reach an unanimity on \\·hether the ah-
senee of rounsel at the imposition of sentence in a federal 
ease rPquirPs rPversal. 
In Kent v. Sanford, 121 F. 2d 216 (1941), the court 
held no prejudice resulted. Compare Batson v. United 
States, 137 F. 2d 288 (1943); Taylor v. Hudspeth, 113 F. 
2d 825 (1940); Losrorn v. Johnsson., 118 F. 2d 704 (1941); 
Janney v. United Sta.tes, 227 F. 2d 105 (1955 ), with Thom-
as v. Hunter, 153 F. 2d 834 (1946) and Martin v. United 
States, 182 F. 2d 225 (1950). It must be concluded that 
the mere absence of counsel at the time of sentencing is 
not a factor evidencing such fundamental unfairness as 
to warrant reversal, because of a denial of federal due 
process. The cases cited by defendant from the federal 
courts did not themselves result in reversal. 
In Sheeha;n v. Delmore, 225 F. 2d 271 (1955 ), the 
Ninth Circuit held that the absence of counsel in a state 
proceeding where defendant was being resentenced was 
not a denial of due process. 
The only real issue to be resolved is whether the 
provisions of the Utah Constitution, Article I, Sections 7 
and 12, require the presence of counsel at every stage of 
the proceeding, irrespective of the prejudice that may 
result. 
The state court decisions are apparently in conflict 
as to ,vhether ·or not the absence of counsel during the 
trial is such an error, constitutional or otherwise, as to 
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require reversal. The conflict is noted in Beaney, The 
Right to Counsel in American Courts, (1955), p. 123, 
where it is said: 
'' * • • there is a division of judicial opinion as to 
the effect of the absence of counsel at any of the 
various stages of trial.'' 
As to the effect of counsel's absence at the sentencing 
portion of the trial, it is generally deplored, but it is 
usually held that in the absence of a showing of preju-
dice, the defendant cannot object. In 24 C. J. S., Crimi-
nal Law, Sec. 1574, it is said: 
''While the practice of sentencing accused in the 
absence of his counsel has been condemned, it has 
been held that where the statute does not so re-
quire, and where the sentence is not considered 
part of the trial, it is not necessary that counsel 
for accused be present when sentence is pro-
nounced, and that the fact that such counsel was 
not present when sentence was pronounced, notice 
of the time having been given to him, in the ab-
sence of a showing that accused was prejudiced 
thereby, is not ground for objection.'' 
Although some cases have indicated an absolute con-
stitutional right to have counsel present at the time of 
sentencing, others have not. JfcCall v. State, 79 So. 2d 51 
(Ala. 1955). In addition, most courts have examined 
the circumstances surrounding the imposition of sen-
tence to ascertain if prejudice resulted before declaring 
a violation of constitutional rights. Typical of the cases, 
and one similar in circumstance to that now before the 
22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
( 
1<>urt, is fJeople v. J)i.sczek, 404 Ill. 465, 89 N.E. 2d 387 
( 1950), "~here the Illinois Court said : 
"The only other contention to be considered is that 
the trial judge failed to advise Pisczek .of his right 
to have counsel at all times throughout the trial. 
\Vhen the court 'vas disposing of the application 
for release on probation, it appeared that the at-
torney who had represented Pisczek throughout 
the trial had withdrawn from the case because he 
had not been paid for legal services previously 
rendered. The reord does not show Pisczek was 
advised of his right to new counsel or that he re-
quested a new attorney. Defendant concedes that 
the mere fact the court did not inform him of his 
right to counsel is not in and of itself a grounrl 
for reversal. His point is that failure to advise 
him of the right to counsel, coupled with other sur-
rounding circumstances attending the fairness of 
the trial does, however, constitute reversible error. 
In the present case, defendant was tried by the 
court without a jury and he was competently rep-
resented by counsel upon the trial of the ca.us~ 
to and including the making of the motion £or pro-
bation. When the application came on for hearing 
eighteen days later, the trial judge had. the pro-
bation report before him. There was but little, 
if anything, that counsel could have accomplished 
at this stage of the proceedings. It may be ob-
served that defendant's n~w counsel 'vho pre-
sented his v.rritten motions for a new trial and 
in arrest of judgment did not make complaint 
in either motion of the point now urged. Under 
the circumstances, we cannot say that defendant 
was denied any constitutional or statutory rights 
for the mere reason that the trial judge who had 
heard the cause without a jury did not appoint 
new counsel to represent him upon the hearing of 
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the motion for release on probation and the sen-
tencing. • • •" 
It is submitted that the Utah cases support the con-
tention that in determining whether there has been a 
deprivation of constitutional rights, where counsel was 
absent from any stage of the proceeding, the facts and 
circumstances of the incident should be examined to de-
termine if prejudice resulted. 
In State v. Stoller, 107 Utah .429, 154 P. 2d 649 
(1945 ), the Utah Court had before it a claim that the 
defendant was denied his constitutional rights because his 
counsel was not present when written instructions were 
given the jury. The court rejected the contention, appar-
ently feeling no prejudice resulted, and no error was 
committed. 
In State v. Beeny, 115 Utah 168, 203 P. 2d 397 (1949), 
the Supreme Court indicated that additional instructions 
could be given to the jury in the absence of counsel. Al-
though the court did not decide the constitutional issue, it 
was aware of it, and inferred that in the absence of 
prejudice, the action would be unobjectionable. 
In State v. Neal, 1 U. 2d 122, 263 P. 2d 756 (1953), 
the defendant raised the very issue raised here; the 
absence of counsel at the time of sentence. The court re-
jected the contention in the absence of prejudice, noting: 
''Absence of counsel at the time of sentence: Neal 
had had 12 days' notice that his sentence would be 
imposed on October 16th. At that time Judge 
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~~llPt t ealled the case and Neal's. counsel "·as not 
I n·est·nt: aerording- to the minute entry of the pro-
ceeding he 'vas asked if he had any reason to sho'Y 
'vhy sentence ~hould not be pronounced upon him. 
He answered that he had none and made no re-
quest or comment coucerning the matter of coun-
sel. A motion for new trial had theretofore been 
filed on October 9th. It was denied and sentence 
"·as imposed. Under the verdict as rendered, with-
out recommendation of leniency, the death sen-
tence 'vas mandatory and there was nothing coun-
sel, nor even the court, could have done except to 
carry out the mandate of the statute. It would be 
a useless formality to remand the case for the 
purpose of having the sentence pronounced with 
counsel present.' ' 3 
In State v. Hines, 6 U. 2d 126, 307 P. 2d 887 (1957), 
the court continued to adhere to its practice of weighing 
for prejudice, for it said: 
''In the absence of any showing of disadvantage to 
the defendant in the procedure followed, it was no 
abuse of discretion nor variance from proper pro-
cedure for the trial court to have the testimony 
read to the jury without insisting that the de-
fendant's counsel be present. (~onsequently, ",.e 
find no prejudicial error as to the defendant 
Hines.'' 
Most recently in Sta.te v. Ga·rcia, 11 U. 2d 67, 355 P. 
2d 57 (1960), the Court refused to reverse a murder con-
viction in the absence of prejudice where the trial judge 
had a conversation with a juror in the absence of counsel 
and the accused. 
3 Contrary to defendant's assertion the point is not one of first impression 
for th"is ·Court. 
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In applying the above case law to the instant sit-
uation, it appears that no ground for reversal exists. 
Several continuances were granted defendant, counsel 
was allowed to present his views on probation to the 
Judge, a pre-sentence report was before the Court, and 
it appears the Court investigated the basis which the 
defendant urged for probation and rejected it. Under 
these circumstances, there was little, if anything, counsel 
could do, and thus no prejudice resulted to defendant. 
Under these circumstances, the defendant certainly was 
not prejudiced or denied a constitutional right, and the 
matter does not warrant reversal. State v. Neal, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant's objections, when properly exam-
ined, appear unmeritorious and the defendant's convic-
tion should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE, 
Assistant Attorney General 
.Attorneys for Respondent 
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